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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Lawrence D. Tarr *
Salvatore Lupica **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article provides an overview of important developments in
workers' compensation law in Virginia during 2003 and the first
part of 2004. It includes analyses of decisions by the Supreme
Court of Virginia, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and the Vir-
ginia Workers' Compensation Commission (the "Commission"),
together with a review of relevant legislative changes made in the
2003 session of the Virginia General Assembly.'
The overview is divided into four sections, each addressing a
discrete set of issues. The first section discusses the scope and
coverage of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act").2
It addresses injuries by accident, occupational diseases, causa-
tion, and liable parties. The second section summarizes develop-
ments in benefits theory and eligibility and, the third, develop-
ments in practice and procedure. The final section provides a
review of 2003 legislation.
* Commissioner, Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, Richmond, Virginia.
1994-present, Chairman, 1994-July 1997, July 2003-present, Chief Deputy Commis-
sioner/Executive Director, 1987-1994, Deputy Commissioner, 1982-1987. B.A., 1970, Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1974 Washington College of Law, American University.
** Assistant to the Chairman, Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, Rich-
mond, Virginia. B.S., 1982, John Carroll University; J.D., 1986, cum laude, University of
Richmond School of Law.
1. A similar piece was last published in 1999. See Daniel E. Lynch, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Workers' Compensation, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1101 (1999).
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -1310 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
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II. SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provides compensa-
tion to individuals who sustain a qualifying work-related "injury"
whether "by accident," or as the result of an "occupational dis-
ease."3 To be compensable under the Act, the injury must be "by
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment."4 Be-
cause a majority of claims processed by the Commission involve
injuries by accident,5 this discussion will begin with a summary of
some important recent cases involving the Commission's re-
quirements for compensability.
A. Injury by Accident
In Pro-Football, Inc. v. Uhlenhake,6 the Court of Appeals of
Virginia examined what constitutes an "accident" within the
meaning of the Act.7 The claimant, an offensive lineman for the
Washington Redskins, was awarded compensation for an injury
found to have been sustained in his participation in a regularly
scheduled game.' The employer contested compensability, argu-
ing that given the nature of professional football with its "high
likelihood of injury,"9 and "'where injuries are customary, foresee-
able, and expected,"' the injuries cannot be deemed "'accidental"'
under the Act.1° Both the Commission and the court of appeals re-
jected this argument.
3. Id. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 2004). The Act defines the pivotal concept of "injury" to
include "occupational disease," thereby extending potential coverage to all work-related
disabling conditions whether caused by accident or disease. Id. The effect, and apparent
purpose of this draftsmanship, is to provide identical treatment regardless of the genesis
of the injury, unless there is a statutory provision expressly indicating otherwise. See id.
Also relevant is the fact that the Act did not originally provide coverage for diseases, but
was subsequently amended in 1944 to do so. Compare id. § 16.76A-1887(2)(d) (1942), with
id. § 16.76A-1887(2)(d) (Supp. 1944).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
5. In 2002, about ninety-six percent of all claim files opened by the Commission are
for injuries by accident. VA. WORKERS' COMP. COMM'N, STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE
CALENDAR YEAR OF 2002, available at http://www.vwc.state.va.us/printable/2002stats.doc
(last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
6. 37 Va. App. 407, 558 S.E.2d 571 (Ct. App. 2002), affd, 265 Va. 1, 574 S.E.2d 288
(2003).
7. 37 Va. App. at 412-13, 558 S.E.2d at 572-74.
8. Id. at 409-10, 558 S.E.2d at 573.
9. Id. at 414, 558 S.E.2d at 575.
10. Id. at 412, 558 S.E.2d at 574.
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The court of appeals began its analysis by recognizing the Act
does not specifically delineate what constitutes an "accident,"
thus leaving the definition to judicial construction. The court
continued with the relevant standard:
[T]o establish an "injury by accident," a claimant must prove (1) that
the injury appeared suddenly at a particular time and place and
upon a particular occasion, (2) that it was caused by an identifiable
incident or sudden precipitating event, and (3) that it resulted in an
obvious mechanical or structural change in the human body.'
2
The court then discussed some nuances to this definition relevant
to the case:
Although the burden is upon the employee "to prove how the injury
occurred and that it is compensable," the principle is well established
that "[t]o constitute injury by accident it is not necessary that there
must be a. . . 'fortuitous circumstance'. .. [or] that there should be
an extraordinary occurrence in or about the work engaged in.
" 13
Moreover, even if an "injury was not accidental as to cause, [if] it was
as to result [ .... ] this is sufficient under the [Act]."' 4
Finding Uhlenhake's claim compensable, the court distin-
guished between the general activity of Uhlenhake's employ-
ment-"to train, practice, and play in football games"-and the
specific incident alleged to have caused the injury, finding the
former to be determinative." It further reasoned that, if it were to
focus on the latter, the effect would be an erroneous introduction
of assumption of risk concepts to workers' compensation where
traditional negligence theories are generally irrelevant. 6 Liken-
ing Uhlenhake's situation to other high-risk professions tradi-
tionally covered by the Act, such as coal mining, steel work, fire-
fighting, and law enforcement work, the court concluded that the
Commission "properly rejected" the employer's contention that
11. Id. at 413, 558 S.E.2d at 574.
12. Id. at 413, 558 S.E.2d at 574 (quoting Southern Express v. Green, 257 Va. 181,
187, 509 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1999)).
13. Id. (quoting Derby v. Swift & Co., 188 Va. App. 336, 344, 49 S.E.2d 417, 421 (Ct.
App. 1984)).
14. Id. (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 387, 363 S.E.2d
433, 430 (Ct. App. 1987); Derby v. Swift & Co., 188 Va. App. 336, 333-34, 49 S.E.2d at 417,
421 (Ct. App. 1984)).
15. Id. at 413, 558 S.E.2d at 574-75.
16. Id. at 416, 558 S.E.2d at 576.
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the probability of injury inherent in this occupation precluded
coverage.7
An injury by accident must also arise "out of and in the course
of the employment" to be compensable. i In Lucas v. Federal Ex-
press Corp.,"9 the claimant, a delivery truck driver, appealed the
Commission's decision denying benefits for injuries she allegedly
sustained when her truck was struck by lightning.2" Applying the
requirement that an injury be one "arising out of and in the
course of the employment"21 to these facts, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia reiterated that these two phrases are distinct and that
the claimant must prove both elements with the requisite degree
of certainty to establish compensability.22 Arising "out of' relates
to "the origin or cause of the injury," while "in the course of' re-
fers to the "time, place, and circumstances under which the acci-
dent occurred."23 Because Lucas established "that the injuries she
sustained were a result of a lightning strike while she was inside
her Federal Express truck following a package pickup[,]" the
court concluded that she had met the "in the course of' require-
ment.24
The remaining issue was whether the injury arose out of her
employment. In analyzing this issue, Virginia courts apply what
is known as the "actual risk test," which requires that the claim-
ant establish that her employment exposed her to the danger that
actually caused the injury.25 The claimant must "prove that the
employment activity in which she was engaged exposed her to the
injurious risk to an extent to which people were not ordinarily
exposed, and thus caused her injuries."26 Because Lucas failed to
introduce evidence "that the particular electrical or structural
17. Id. at 417, 558 S.E.2d at 576.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
19. 41 Va. App. 130, 583 S.E.2d 56 (Ct. App. 2003).
20. Id. at 131, 583 S.E.2d at 57.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
22. 41 Va. App. at 133-34, 583 S.E.2d at 58 (citing County of Chesterfield v. Johnson,
237 Va. 180, 183, 376 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1989)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 134, 583 S.E.2d at 59.
25. Id., 583 S.E.2d at 58 (quoting Lucas v. Lucas, 212 Va. 561, 563, 186 S.E.2d 63, 64
(1972)).
26. Id., 583 S.E.2d at 59.
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characteristics" of her truck were the cause of her injury, she
failed to satisfy this standard.27
Perhaps the most frequently litigated scenarios implicating
these aspects of the "arising out of' requirement involve slips,
trips, or falls at work. For instance, in Grayson County School
Board v. Cornett,2" the claimant, a school bus driver, claimed
benefits for injuries she sustained when she fell going down the
steps of her bus.29 Although the Commission's deputy commis-
sioner ° denied the claim finding that the alleged accident did not
arise from the employment, the Commission reversed.
On appeal, the employer argued that there was insufficient
evidence that the claimant "sustain[ed] an injury by accident
arising from her employment."32 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
affirmed the Commission's award, finding persuasive the claim-
ant's testimony about the peculiar nature of the bus steps, includ-
ing their unusual height and angle which made them "different
from normal bus steps."33 This distinguished Cornett's accident
from a simple "fall down [the] stairs [that] does not arise out of
the employment without evidence of a defect in the stairs or evi-
dence that a condition of the employment caused the fall."34 The
claimant's testimony as to idiosyncrasies in the steps' construc-
tion, together with the supporting medical documentation, pro-
vided an ample evidentiary basis supporting the award.35
27. Id. at 136, 583 S.E.2d at 60.
28. 39 Va. App. 279, 572 S.E.2d 505 (Ct. App. 2002).
29. Id. at 281, 572 S.E.2d at 506.
30. "Deputy commissioner" is the Commission's designation for its hearing officers.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-203 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
31. Cornett, 39 Va. App. at 286, 572 S.E.2d at 508. The deputy commissioner's deci-
sion was apparently based on a credibility determination. See id. at 286, 572 S.E.2d at
508. This does not, however, affect the subsequent resolution of the core compensability
holding. See id. at 288, 572 S.E.2d at 510.
32. Id. at 286, 572 S.E.2d at 509.
33. Id. at 287-88, 572 S.E.2d at 509.
34. Id. at 287, 572 S.E.2d at 509 (citing Southside Va. Training Ctr. v. Shell, 20 Va.
App. 199, 203, 455 S.E.2d 761, 763 (Ct. App. 1995)).
35. Id. at 288, 572 S.E.2d at 510. The Commission's factual findings "that are sup-
ported by credible evidence are conclusive and binding.., on appeal." Southern Iron
Works, Inc. v. Wallace, 16 Va. App. 131, 134, 428 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ct. App. 1993). The Com-
mission's findings, if supported by credible evidence, or reasonable inferences drawn from
the evidence, will not be disturbed on review, even though the record may contain evi-
dence to support a contrary finding. Morris v. Badger PowhatanlFiggie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va.
App. 276, 279, 348 S.E.2d 876, 877 (Ct. App. 1986).
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K & G Abatement Co. v. Keil36 posed an interesting evidentiary
issue as to whether a roofer's apparent fall was sufficiently shown
to arise out of his employment.37 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
summarized the salient facts as follows:
Keil left the second story roof workstation to descend to the ground
to place a telephone call. He climbed down a permanent ladder to the
first story roof where he was then out of the other roofers' sight. In
order to go from the first story roof to the ground, Keil had to lower a
twenty-foot extension ladder to the ground. Several people inside the
school heard the sound of the extension ladder being displaced and
something striking the concrete pavement.
Shortly thereafter, Keil was found lying on the ground.., with an
open-head wound. Loose gravel from the roof was found on the
ground around him. 38
No one saw Keil fall, nor was he able to provide information
about the accident because he died shortly after being taken to
the hospital. 39 The death certificate, however, stated that "death
was caused by 'closed chest and head injuries.'""
Affirming the Commission's award of benefits to Keil's widow,
the court of appeals rejected the employer's argument that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that the fatal injuries arose
out of the employment.41 The court reasoned that, although the
Commission erroneously applied the unexplained death presump-
tion found in Southern Motor Lines Co. v. Alvis42 because Keil was
not dead when he was found at the jobsite,43 the circumstances of
the accident, together with the death certificate and testimony of-
fered by the medical examiner, sufficiently established the requi-
site causal nexus.44
36. 38 Va. App 744, 568 S.E.2d 416 (Ct. App. 2002).
37. Id. at 747, 568 S.E.2d at 417-18.
38. Id. at 748, 568 S.E.2d at 418.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 755, 568 S.E.2d at 421.
42. 200 Va. 168, 171-72, 104 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1958) ("[W]here an employee is found
dead as the result of an accident at his place of work or nearby,... the court will indulge
the presumption that the relation of master and servant existed at the time of the accident
and that it arose out of and in the course of his employment.").
43. Keil, 38 Va. App. at 757, 568 S.E.2d at 422.
44. Id. at 759, 568 S.E.2d at 423 (citing Smithfield Packing Co. v. Carlton, 29 Va. App.
176, 181, 510 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1999)).
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B. Disease Conditions
Since 1944, the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act has cov-
ered disease conditions caused by employment.4 1 It creates a dis-
tinction between an "occupational disease," defined as "a disease
arising out of and in the course of employment,"46 and an "ordi-
nary disease of life," which is one "to which the general public is
exposed outside of the employment."47 This distinction is crucial
because the claimant has a heavier "clear and convincing" eviden-
tiary standard to meet in order to demonstrate that an "ordinary
disease of life" should be treated as a compensable "occupational
disease."48
Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department v. Mottram,49 a case
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia, involved a
condition implicating not only both categories of disease condi-
tions, but also injuries by accident.5 Mottram had worked as a
paramedic and as a paramedic supervisor for nineteen years
when he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder
("PTSD").51 He filed an initial claim for benefits alleging an injury
by accident, and a subsequent claim alleging his condition was
compensable as an occupational disease. 2 No appeal was taken
from the Commission's decision denying the first claim. 3 Thereaf-
ter, the Commission denied the second claim as well, "finding
that Mottram's PTSD was not compensable because it was a con-
dition resulting from cumulative or repetitive trauma, rather
than a disease."54 Mottram appealed the Commission's decision.5
In its decision, the Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to
prior precedent, "recogniz[ing] that, under appropriate circum-
stances, PTSD may be compensable as an injury by accident...
because it resulted from 'an obvious sudden shock or fright aris-
45. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
46.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-400, -401 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
48. See id. § 65.2-401 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
49. 263 Va. 365, 559 S.E.2d 698 (2002).
50. Id. at 367, 559 S.E.2d at 699.
51. Id. at 368, 559 S.E.2d at 699.
52. Id. at 370, 559 S.E.2d at 700.
53. Id.
54. Id., 559 S.E.2d at 700-01.
55. Id. at 371, 559 S.E.2d at 701.
2004]
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ing in the course of employment"'56 The court also acknowledged
that PTSD could, under other circumstances, be treated as a dis-
ease condition. 7 Because the medical evidence indicated that
Mottram's PTSD resulted from changes in his neurological chem-
istry brought about in response to repeated work-related external
stimuli and was "suffered as a result of ongoing stress," it was a
potentially compensable disease condition rather than the non-
compensable result of cumulative trauma.58 However, "Iblecause
PTSD is a condition that may develop from the general stresses of
life... it is an ordinary disease of life," covered by Virginia Code
section 65.2-401 rather than an occupational disease under sec-
tion 65.2-400.59 The court reversed the Commission's denial of
benefits and remanded the matter for a determination as to
whether Mottram's specific case was compensable under this ra-
tionale.6 °
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed that Mottram's PTSD
was properly viewed as a disease,61 but disagreed with the court
of appeals as to whether it was an occupational disease or an or-
dinary disease of life.62 Although the supreme court acknowledged
that it was "a medical issue to be decided by the trier of fact,"63
the court ultimately concluded, as a matter of law, that
Mottram's PTSD was an occupational disease compensable under
Virginia Code section 65.2-400.64 The court found determinative
medical evidence "that Mottram's PTSD was 'intimately related
to his service-connected activities' and that there was "no evi-
56. Mottram v. Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Dep't, 35 Va. App. 85, 93, 542 S.E.2d
811, 814 (Ct. App. 2001), affd in part and rev'd in part, 263 Va. 365, 559 S.E.2d 698 (2002)
(citing Hercules v. Gunther, 13 Va. App. 357, 362-63, 412 S.E.2d 185, 188 (Ct. App. 1991)).
57. Id. at 93-94, 542 S.E.2d at 814-15 (citing Teasley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 14
Va. App. 45, 415 S.E.2d 596 (Ct. App. 1992)).
58. Id. at 95-96, 542 S.E.2d at 815. The Mottram court applied A New Leaf Inc. v.
Webb, 257 Va. 190, 511 S.E.2d 102 (1999), which found that a flower shop employee's al-
lergic dermatitis, resulting from repeated exposure to plant chemicals, was a reaction of
the immune system rather than impairment from cumulative trauma resulting from re-
petitive motion. Therefore, it was compensable as a disease condition. Id. at 197-98, 511
S.E.2d at 105.
59. Mottram, 35 Va. App. at 96, 542 S.E.2d at 816.
60. Id.
61. Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Dep't v. Mottram, 263 Va. 365, 373, 559 S.E.2d 698,
702 (2002).
62. Id. at 373-74, 559 S.E.2d at 702.
63. Id. at 375, 559 S.E.2d at 703 (quoting Knott v. Blue Bell, Inc., 7 Va. App. 335, 338,
373 S.E.2d 481, 483 (Ct. App. 1988)).
64. Id.
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dence that Mottram was exposed to traumatic events outside his
employment."65
The stringency of the "clear and convincing" evidentiary stan-
dard applied in ordinary diseases of life cases is frequently illus-
trated in claims for carpal tunnel syndrome ("CTS").66 In Stead-
man v. Liberty Fabrics, Inc.,67 the claimant appealed the
Commission's determination denying her CTS claim based on its
finding that she had not proved, by clear and convincing evidence,
that her CTS was not caused by activities outside her work."8 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia began its analysis by summarizing
the prerequisites for compensability applicable to ordinary dis-
eases of life:
Before a claimant may be compensated for an ordinary disease of
life, she must prove that the disease (1) arose out of and in the
course of her employment, (2) did not result from causes outside of
the employment, and (3) occurred incident to an occupational dis-
ease, an infectious or contagious disease contracted in the course of
the employment listed in Code § 65.2-401(2)(b), or is characteristic of
the employment and was caused by conditions peculiar to the em-
ployment.
6 9
The court of appeals defined the "clear and convincing" eviden-
tiary standard applicable to each element as:
[t]hat measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of
the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations
sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere
preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required
65. Id.
66. Ordinary diseases of life may be considered compensable occupational diseases,
provided the claimant shows, through clear and convincing evidence, that certain condi-
tions exist. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-401 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004). Carpal tunnel
syndrome was historically held to be the non-compensable result of cumulative trauma
brought about by repetitive motion. See Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 199, 467
S.E.2d 795, 802 (1996). Effective July 1, 1997, however, Virginia Code section 65.2-400
was amended to provide that CTS was an ordinary disease of life covered by section 65.2-
401. Act of Feb. 17, 1997, ch. 15, 1997 Va. Acts 40 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 65.2-400(c) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004)).
67. 41 Va. App. 796, 589 S.E.2d 465 (Ct. App. 2003).
68. Id. at 802, 589 S.E.2d at 468.
69. Id. at 803, 589 S.E.2d at 468 (citing Lanning v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 37 Va. App.
701, 706, 561 S.E.2d 33, 36 (Ct. App. 2002)).
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beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean
clear and unequivocal.
70
After noting that the Commission's determinations as to causa-
tion are findings of fact binding on appeal,71 the court affirmed
the conclusion that the claimant's statement that she did not "'do
any activities outside of work' was insufficient to prove that her
CTS did not result from causes other than her employment.72
The court distinguished Steadman's evidence from that pre-
sented by the claimant in Lee County School Board v. Miller.73
Importantly, in Lee County School Board, the "claimant testified
that she engaged in no hobbies or other activities outside her
work which involved ... motion" thought to cause her condition.74
The record in Lee County School Board included "statements from
[the] claimant's doctors that [her] CTS did not result from any
causes outside of the employment."75 Although such statements
are not always critical because "finding[s] of causation need not
be based exclusively on medical evidence,"76 the absence of such
medical evidence in Steadman sufficiently supported the Com-
mission's finding that the claimant's "testimony that she engaged
in no activities outside of her employment fails to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the myriad of her life activities out-
side her employment were not the cause of her CTS.""
In Blue Ridge Market of Virginia, Inc. v. Patton,7" the court of
appeals addressed the compensability of an exacerbation of a pre-
existing disease condition by an accidental injury.79 Philmon Pat-
ton injured his right arm in a compensable slip and fall. ° The fall
caused a tear in his right pectoral muscle for which he received a
70. Id., 589 S.E.2d at 468-69 (quoting Nat'l Fruit Prod. Co. v. Staton, 28 Va. App. 650,
654, 507 S.E.2d 667, 669 (Ct. App. 1998)).
71. Id., 589 S.E.2d at 469 (citing Marcus v. Arlington County Bd. of Supervisors, 15
Va. App. 544, 551, 425 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Ct. App. 1993)).
72. Id. at 804, 806, 589 S.E.2d at 469-70.
73. 38 Va. App. 253, 563 S.E.2d 374 (Ct. App. 2002).
74. Id. at 264, 563 S.E.2d at 379.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 260, 563 S.E.2d at 377 (citing Dollar Gen'l Store v. Cridlin, 22 Va. App. 171,
176, 468 S.E.2d 152, 154 (1996)).
77. Steadman, 41 Va. App. at 806, 589 S.E.2d at 470.
78. 39 Va. App. 592, 575 S.E.2d 574 (Ct. App. 2003).
79. Id. at 594-95, 575 S.E.2d at 575.
80. Id. at 595, 575 S.E.2d at 575.
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permanent partial disability rating."' Subsequently, a treating
physician diagnosed Patton with bilateral CTS and opined "that
'the carpal tunnel on the right was secondary to his fall and the
carpal tunnel on the left was not,"' and that the "'underlying car-
pal tunnel disease' was 'aggravated' and 'exacerbated' by his acci-
dent."'8 2 The rating was increased by the amount of disability at-
tributable to the right-side CTS." The Commission awarded the
claim on the theory that the injury by accident aggravated the
pre-existing CTS.84
On the employer's appeal, the court of appeals asked whether
"Virginia law allow[s] a claimant who sustains an initial com-
pensable injury by accident to recover disability benefits for that
portion of the disability resulting from aggravation, by the acci-
dent, of an ordinary disease of life?" 5 Answering this question in
the affirmative,86 the court of appeals expressly rejected the em-
ployer's argument, which relied on Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean. 7 In
Bean, compensation was denied for the exacerbation of the claim-
ant's bunions on her feet caused by her extensive standing, a con-
dition of her work.88 The court in Blue Ridge Market distin-
guished Patton's situation because the exacerbation of his disease
was attributable to an intervening compensable accident rather
than merely the conditions of his employment.89 It thus came
within "'[tihe general rule ... that [a] causal connection is estab-
lished when it is shown that an employee has received a com-
pensable injury which materially aggravates or accelerates a pre-
existing latent disease.'"'9 The Commission's award was af-
firmed.9'
81. Id., 575 S.E.2d at 575-76.
82. Id., 575 S.E.2d at 576.
83. Id. at 596, 575 S.E.2d at 576.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 597, 575 S.E.2d at 576.
86. See id. at 599, 575 S.E.2d at 578.
87. 225 Va. 1, 300 S.E.2d 739 (1983).
88. Id. at 3, 300 S.E.2d at 739; see Blue Ridge Market, 39 Va. App. at 597-98, 575
S.E.2d at 577.
89. See Blue Ridge Market, 39 Va. App. at 599, 575 S.E.2d at 577-78.
90. Id. at 598, 575 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Justice v. Panther Coal Co., 173 Va. 1, 6-7,
2 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1939)).
91. Blue Ridge Market, 39 Va. App. at 601, 575 S.E.2d at 578-79; see also Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Robinson, 37 Va. App. 436, 442-43, 559 S.E.2d 381, 384 (Ct. App.
2002) (holding that an aggravation of a pre-existing emotional condition by a compensable
accident is a compensable injury).
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One of the more vexing issues in occupational disease cases is
the application of the evidentiary presumption found in Virginia
Code section 65.2-402. Certain respiratory conditions, coronary
conditions, and specified forms of cancer, are "presumed to be oc-
cupational diseases, suffered in the line of duty" and are "covered
by" the statute for identified law enforcement officers, emergency
response personnel, and firefighters.92 The employer may rebut
the presumption by introducing "a preponderance of competent
[medical] evidence to the contrary" thereby requiring the claim-
ant to prove causation in the standard manner.93 This provision
generates extensive litigation on questions regarding the proper
allocation of the parties' respective burdens of proof, and their
relative success in carrying those burdens.94
The claimant in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v.
Lusby9 5 alleged that his coronary artery disease ("CAD") was a
compensable occupational disease.96 Lusby worked for the Metro-
politan Washington Airports Authority ("MWAA") as a firefighter,
and it was undisputed that he was among those workers who
could invoke the Virginia Code section 65.2-402 presumption.97
While he did not actually fight fires, his work included "training
drills and exercises' and, on occasion, outdoor inspections."9" He
introduced evidence that he did not have CAD before his em-
ployment with MWAA, but "his medical history was significant
for hypertension that was controlled by medication, high choles-
terol, obesity, diabetes, and color blindness."99
As is often true in cases of this type, there was conflicting
medical evidence as to the etiology of Lusby's CAD. "Dr. Holland
stated that non-work-related factors caused Lusby's coronary ar-
tery disease, specifically noting a 'combination of "bad genes" and
lifestyle choices;'" he discounted the contributing role of certain
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-402 (A)-(C) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
93. Id. § 65.2-402(A) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
94. See, e.g., Bass v. City of Richmond Police Dep't, 258 Va. 103, 112-15, 515 S.E.2d
557, 561-63 (1999) (discussing the "occupational disease" presumption and the evidence
needed to overcome the presumption).
95. 41 Va. App. 300, 585 S.E.2d 318 (Ct. App. 2003).
96. Id. at 304, 585 S.E.2d at 319.
97. Id. at 305, 310-11, 585 S.E.2d at 320, 323.
98. Id. at 305, 585 S.E.2d at 320.
99. Id. at 306, 585 S.E.2d at 320.
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cardiotoxic chemicals.' °0 Dr. Israel contested the existence of a
scientific basis for linking CAD and occupational stress generally,
concluding that Lusby's CAD "'would not be causally related to
work activities as a firefighter, even if he were an active fire-
fighter over the years. '""' The record also included Dr. Shah's
contrasting diagnosis of stress-induced ischemia and his recom-
mendation that Lusby find other employment.0 2 Dr. Shah also
observed that Lusby's work required "'extreme exertion under ex-
treme conditions."'1 3 Additionally, Dr. Schwartz stated that "one
must conclude that it is at least as likely that [Lusby's] occupa-
tional stress contributed to his [CAD] as his hyperlipidemia." 10 4
The deputy commissioner denied the claim, finding that al-
though Lusby could invoke the statutory presumption, MWAA
had introduced sufficient evidence to overcome it.' 05 The Commis-
sion reversed, holding that the evidence provided by Drs. Shah
and Schwartz left the record in equipoise, requiring a finding that
MWAA had failed to dispel the presumption.0 6
The Court of Appeals of Virginia described the test for deter-
mining whether an employer has overcome the statutory pre-
sumption as follows:
[An employer overcomes the statutory presumption by showing
"both that 1) claimant's disease was not caused by his employment,
and 2) there was a non-work related cause of the disease.... [I]f the
employer does not prove by a preponderance of the evidence both
parts of this two-part test, the employer has failed to overcome the
statutory presumption."
10 7
Acknowledging the limited scope of review applied to the
Commission's findings of fact, the court concluded that there was
an adequate evidentiary basis supporting the Commission's hold-
ing.' The court further noted that MWAA's evidence "consti-
tuted 'mere general denials' that coronary heart disease is work-
100. Id. at 308-09, 585 S.E.2d at 322.
101. Id. at 309-10, 585 S.E.2d at 322.
102. Id. at 308, 585 S.E.2d at 321.
103. Id. at 307, 585 S.E.2d at 321.
104. Id. at 310, 585 S.E.2d at 323.
105. Id. at 304, 585 S.E.2d at 319-20.
106. Id. at 311-12, 585 S.E.2d at 323.
107. Id. (quoting Bass, 258 Va. at 114, 515 S.E.2d at 562-563).
108. Id. at 312, 585 S.E.2d at 323.
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related,... and did not rebut the 'positive opinions' regarding
causation given by Drs. Schwartz and Shah."' 9 Stressing that
both prongs of the Bass test must be satisfied, the court of ap-
peals rejected the employer's argument that its evidence of non-
work-related causes for Lusby's CAD was sufficient to overcome
the presumption."' Finally, because the Commission sufficiently
weighed the competing evidence, the court of appeals held that
MWAA's reliance on Henrico County Division of Fire v. Woody
was misplaced."'
In Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Reed,"2 the employer appealed the
award of medical benefits for pneumoconiosis ("CWP"), a pulmo-
nary disease afflicting coal miners."' The employer contested the
award because the disease had not yet caused disability that
would entitle Reed to weekly disability benefits." 4 On appeal, the
employer questioned the Commission's reliance on Jones v. E.L
DuPont de Nemours & Co."' to support the award, arguing that
Jones should be expressly overruled or, in the alternative, limited
to cases involving asbestosis, the disease specifically at issue in
that case. 1 6 The Court of Appeals of Virginia declined to do ei-
ther.
With regard to the invitation to overrule Jones, the court of ap-
peals noted that, although Jones was a panel decision, it was
nonetheless binding precedent that "cannot be overruled except
by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc or by the Virginia Su-
preme Court."" 7 The court of appeals further concluded that the
structure of the Act itself justified the Commission's application
109. Id. at 312, 585 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting Madlin v. County of Henrico Police, 34 Va.
App. 396,407, 542 S.E.2d 33, 39 (2001)).
110. Id. at 313-14, 585 S.E.2d at 324.
111. Id. at 314, 585 S.E.2d at 324-25; see Henrico County Div. of Fire v. Woody, 39 Va.
App. 322, 327-29, 572 S.E.2d 526, 528-29 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the Commission's
failure to address both prongs of the Bass test constituted reversible error requiring re-
mand).
112. 40 Va. App. 69, 577 S.E.2d 538 (Ct. App. 2003).
113. Id. at 71-72, 577 S.E.2d at 539.
114. Id.
115. 24 Va. App. 36, 38, 480 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1997) (finding that, where the presence of
asbestosis is established, an award of benefits is required even if the condition has not
reached a ratable level or resulted in disability).
116. Clinchfield Coal, 40 Va. App. at 71, 577 S.E.2d at 539.
117. Id. at 73, 577 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 425, 430
470 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1996)).
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of the Jones rationale in CWP cases as well as asbestosis cases.'18
In reaching its decision, the court commented that the Act pro-
vides two distinct categories of benefits-wage loss payments and
payment of related medical expenses-and that, generally, enti-
tlement to medical benefits is not dependent upon wage loss or
disability.119 Although the Act frequently draws distinctions be-
tween CWP and asbestosis, no distinction is made as to the avail-
ability of medical benefits. 2 ° Accordingly, since there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the Commission's finding that Reed had
CWP, the award of medical benefits was appropriate under
Jones.'21
C. Causation
Regardless of whether the initial compensable event is an in-
jury by accident or occupational disease, there is the possibility
that the connection between the condition for which the claimant
seeks benefits and the compensable event is too attenuated to
support an award of benefits. This was the issue in Paul Johnson
Plastering v. Johnson.'2
Paul Johnson sustained a compensable injury on January 15,
1990 resulting in a fracture of his right wrist.'23 He later com-
plained of "vision problems, headaches, and depression."' John-
son filed a claim for benefits in November 1990 alleging injury to
his "r[igh]t wrist, head, back, left leg and foot," for which he re-
ceived both temporary total and temporary partial disability
benefits.'25 He continued to receive treatment for depression, and
for the "other neurological problems" diagnosed as "related to de-
pression which 'could be triggered' by the head injury."126
118. Id. at 76, 577 S.E.2d at 541.
119. See id. at 75, 577 S.E.2d at 541.
120. Id. at 76, 577 S.E.2d at 541.
121. Id. at 79, 577 S.E.2d at 543. The opinion includes a lengthy discussion about the
rating system used to classify the stages of pneumoconiosis. Id. at 76-78, 577 S.E.2d at
541-42. A summary of this discussion, however, is not necessary to an understanding of
the most important issues addressed in the case.
122. 265 Va. 237, 576 S.E.2d 447 (2003).
123. Id. at 239, 576 S.E.2d at 448.
124. Id., 576 S.E.2d at 449.
125. Id. at 240, 576 S.E.2d at 449.
126. Id. at 239, 576 S.E.2d at 449.
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In 1995, a specialist stated, "Johnson's cognitive defects were
'consistent with the diagnosis of a traumatic brain injury' sus-
tained in the January 1990 industrial accident."127 Further, in
1998, a rehabilitation counselor "concluded that Johnson was
permanently and totally disabled because of his 'deficits due to
the traumatic brain injury.' 12
In May 1999 Johnson filed a new claim for permanent total
disability benefits, alleging a brain injury compensable under
Virginia Code section 65.2-503(C)(3).12 9 He argued that the brain
injury either was the direct result of the accident or developed
from the depressive disorder that was caused by the compensable
injury."o Johnson introduced medical evidence that "his disability
resulted from a structural change in his brain or a brain injury
that developed from his depression which in turn was caused by
the injury to his wrist, or, alternatively, from a brain injury suf-
fered when his head hit the ground in the 1990 fall."'31 The Com-
mission denied the claim, finding "that Johnson failed to timely
file [a] claim for a brain injury" sustained at the time of the initial
accident. 13
2
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed this determination,
reasoning that the initial claim for a head injury was not suffi-
cient to state a claim for a brain injury and that no other claim
for the latter was filed within the limitations period. 13 3 The court
of appeals remanded the case for further findings, however, after
it held, under the rationale of Daniel Construction Co. v. Tolley,"'
that the disabling brain injury may be covered as a compensable
consequence of the depression that was shown to be related to the
initial accident.135 On subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed with the court of appeals' analysis of the statute
127. Id. at 240, 576 S.E.2d at 449.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 241, 576 S.E.2d at 450.
132. Id. at 242, 576 S.E.2d at 450.
133. Johnson v. Paul Johnson Plastering & Nat'l Sur. Corp., 37 Va. App. 716, 723, 561
S.E.2d 40, 43 (Ct. App. 2002), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 265 Va. 237, 576 S.E.2d 447
(2003) [hereinafter Paul Johnson Plastering].
134. 24 Va. App. 70, 76-78, 480 S.E.2d 145, 148-49 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a
brain injury resulting from PTSD was compensable where PTSD was the direct result of
an industrial accident).
135. Paul Johnson Plastering, 37 Va. App. at 726-27, 561 S.E.2d 45-46.
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of limitations issue, but reversed the holding of possible
compensability as a covered consequence of the initial accident. 136
The supreme court concluded that the court of appeals was cor-
rect in holding, under Daniel Construction, that Virginia Code
section 65.2-503 can support an award for a brain injury develop-
ing after the compensable accident. 137 It determined, however,
that the connection between the accident and the subsequent
brain injury in Johnson's case was too attenuated to establish the
requisite causation. 138 Relying on Amoco Foam Products Co. v.
Johnson,139 the supreme court concluded that "if the brain injury
was caused by the depression which developed from the wrist in-
jury, the brain injury is not compensable because ... there is no
direct causal link between that brain injury and the original in-
dustrial accident injury, the wrist injury."140
D. Liable Parties
Generally, the Act applies only to those employers who have
three or more employees regularly in service in Virginia.'
Whether the employer is properly subject to liability, based upon
the number of its employees, is frequently litigated, as in Mark
Five Construction Co. v. Gonzalez. 42
The Mark Five Construction Company ("Mark Five") was a
general contractor incorporated in Maryland and authorized to do
business in Virginia.' Mark Five contracted with insurance
companies to make insured repairs and to inspect damaged prop-
erties.'" It had "between thirty-five to fifty employees at various
times, and it engage[d] various subcontractors to perform a sig-
nificant amount of its restoration work." 4 ' The Virginia project
136. See Paul Johnson Plastering, 265 Va. at 244, 576 S.E.2d at 452.
137. Id. at 244, 576 S.E.2d at 451.
138. See id. at 244, 576 S.E.2d at 452.
139. 257 Va. 29, 510 S.E.2d 443 (1999). The supreme court stated that "[tihe link of
causation must directly connect the original accidental injury with the additional injury
for which compensation is sought." Id. at 33, 510 S.E.2d at 445.
140. Paul Johnson Plastering, 265 Va. at 244, 576 S.E.2d at 452.
141. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
142. 42 Va. App. 59, 590 S.E.2d 81 (Ct. App. 2003).
143. Id. at 60-61, 590 S.E.2d at 82.
144. Id. at 61, 590 S.E.2d at 82.
145. Id.
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on which the claimant was injured lasted eight months, greatly in
excess of the average project duration of about one week.14 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the Commission's determi-
nation that, given the nature of Mark Five's operations in Vir-
ginia, those individuals performing its work here were "regularly
in service" and should be counted toward the jurisdictional num-
ber of employees.147
As to the burden of proof on this issue, the court of appeals re-
iterated previous holdings that once the worker proves he was in-
jured in Virginia the putative employer bears the burden of prov-
ing that it had fewer than three workers regularly in service in
Virginia.14 When weighing the evidence on this point, it is proper
for the Commission to analyze
the statutory language "to apply not only to the number of employees
engaged in performing the employer's established mode of work, but
also, to require that the character of the business' 'contacts and ac-
tivities' within the Commonwealth be more than 'irregular or merely
occasional' to allow jurisdiction over the claim."149
Mark Five's business sufficiently met these requirements because
it had been "registered to do business in Virginia since 1996," and
it accepted work "in Virginia when contracted to do so by various
insurance companies."150
The court also found important the fact that the project on
which the claimant was injured lasted eight months and that dur-
ing that time "Mark Five engaged the services of four subcontrac-
tors and regularly employed the requisite number of individu-
als."151 The relatively short duration of its other projects did not
militate against a finding of liability as "the commission could
146. Id.
147. Id. at 64-65, 590 S.E.2d at 84.
148. Id. at 62, 590 S.E.2d at 83 (citing Craddock Moving & Storage Co. v. Settles, 16
Va. App. 1, 2, 427 S.E.2d 428, 429 (Ct. App. 1993), aft'd per curiam, 247 Va. 165, 440
S.E.2d 613 (1994)).
149. Id. at 63, 590 S.E.2d at 83 (quoting Bois v. Blizzard, 39 Va. App. 216, 222, 571
S.E.2d 924, 927 (Ct. App. 2002) (deeming a West Virginia hockey team's business not
"regular" within the meaning of section 65.2-101 and, holding therefore, that the employer
was not subject to Act)); see also Pro-Football, Inc. v. Paul, 39 Va. App. 1, 10, 569 S.E.2d
66, 71 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding a professional football team to be a liable employer and sub-
ject to the Act where the claimant's contract was completed in Virginia).
150. Mark Five Constr. Co., 42 Va. App. at 64, 590 S.E.2d at 83.
151. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 84.
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reasonably infer that these short-term assignments resulted in"
other, perhaps longer, projects in Virginia.152
Another frequently litigated liability issue is a party's amena-
bility to civil suit in negligence for injuries compensable under
the Act. This was the pivotal issue in Clean Sweep Professional
Parking Lot Maintenance, Inc. v. Talley.'53 Talley was employed
by Coleman Trucking, a subcontractor of Virginia Paving, on a
project for the Virginia Department of Transportation.154 Talley
was injured when a truck he was examining was struck by a ve-
hicle owned by Clean Sweep, another of Virginia Paving's subcon-
tractors.155 Talley filed suit against Clean Sweep and the operator
of its vehicle, each of whom filed a plea in bar asserting that the
remedies provided in the Act were Talley's sole remedies, and
that the civil suit against them was barred.5 6 "The trial court
overruled the pleas" and a verdict was returned for Talley.'57
The Supreme Court of Virginia began its review of the case by
reiterating that, generally, "[tihe rights and remedies provided in
the Act are exclusive of all other rights and remedies of an em-
ployee or his estate at common law or otherwise."' Virginia Code
section 65.2-309(A), however, does not bar suit against an "other
party."5 9 An "other party" is "'a stranger to the trade, occupation,
or business in which the employee was engaged when he was in-
jured.""'16 Stated alternatively, "'an allegedly negligent employee
of one contractor, engaged in the same business or project of an
owner as an injured employee of another contractor, is not an
'other party' amenable to suit.""16'
Applying these principles, the court found it important that
Coleman Trucking was performing work of the same nature as
that done by Virginia Paving, and that Coleman Trucking's work
was an essential part of Virginia Paving's work under its contract
152. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 83-84.
153. 267 Va. 210, 591 S.E.2d 79 (2004).
154. Id. at 212, 591 S.E.2d at 80.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 212-13, 591 S.E.2d at 80-81.
158. Id. at 213, 591 S.E.2d at 81.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Peck v. Safway Steel Prods., Inc., 262 Va. App. 522, 525, 551 S.E.2d
328, 329 (Ct. App. 2001)).
161. Id. (quoting Evans v. Hook, 239 Va. 127, 131, 387 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1990)).
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with the Department of Transportation.162 These facts distinguish
Talley's situation from those involving mere delivery functions
held not to be in the allegedly shared trade or business.'63 The
court concluded that, because Coleman Trucking was not simply
delivering goods, and because it was engaged in the same work as
was Virginia Paving, "Coleman trucking was not a stranger to the
work of Virginia Paving, and its employee, Talley, was a statutory
employee of Virginia Paving.""6 Therefore, because Talley was
not contesting whether Clean Sweep was engaged in the same
trade or business as Virginia Paving, he and the operator of
Clean Sweep's vehicle were both statutory employees, and his
civil suit was barred under the Act.
165
The Act's exclusive effect was also at issue in Jones v. Com-
monwealth.'6 6 In Jones, the supreme court identified the opera-
tive question as "whether the University of Virginia ["UVA"] is a
governmental entity for the purposes of determining its status as
a statutory employer."'67 The claimant was working for an inde-
pendent contractor doing asbestos abatement work on the
grounds of UVA when he received an electrical shock. 6 The cir-
cuit court dismissed his civil action against UVA, finding that it
was his statutory employer and, therefore, suit was barred under
Virginia Code section 65.2-307.169 On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Virginia, the claimant challenged the circuit court's de-
terminations that UVA was a governmental entity capable of be-
ing a statutory employer, and that the activity giving rise to the
claim was part of UVA's trade or business.7
The court quoted the code provision that is the source of the
statutory employer doctrine:
When any person (referred to in this section as "owner") undertakes
to perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, business
or occupation and contracts with any other person (referred to in this
162. Id. at 216-17, 591 S.E.2d at 83.
163. Id. at 216, 591 S.E.2d at 83.
164. Id. at 217, 591 S.E.2d at 83.
165. Id. The court also rejected Talley's argument that his work examining the vehicle
was a "discrete activity" taking it out of the shared "trade or business" at issue. Id.
166. 267 Va. 218, 591 S.E.2d 72 (2004).
167. Id. at 220, 591 S.E.2d at 73-74.
168. Id., 591 S.E.2d at 74.
169. Id. at 222, 591 S.E.2d at 74.
170. Id. at 221, 591 S.E.2d at 74.
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section as "subcontractor") for the execution or performance by or
under such subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work under-
taken by such owner, the owner shall be liable to pay to any worker
employed in the work any compensation under this title which he
would have been liable to pay if the worker had been immediately
employed by him. 171
"Once an owner is found to be a statutory employer, it is sub-
ject to all the mandates, duties, and rights" provided in the Act,
including the exclusive remedy provision.172
Jones' first argument was that UVA was not a governmental
entity capable of coming within the statutory employer doc-
trine. 173 In response, the court noted that "[i]t would challenge
reason to suggest that an institution, subject at all times to the
control of the legislature, is not a governmental entity."'74 Apply-
ing the rationale in Phillips v. University of Virginia,'75 the court
concluded that, because UVA is "established by statute, is gov-
erned and controlled solely by the General Assembly, owns prop-
erty through money appropriated by the General Assembly," and
has as its "very essence ... public use and service,... [it] is a
governmental entity" that could be a statutory employer. 176 The
remaining question was whether the claimant was engaged in the
trade or business of UVA when he was injured. 177
The analysis to determine the "trade or business" of a govern-
mental entity differs from that applied to private entities. 178 The
"normal work test" applicable to private entities does not apply to
governmental entities.1 79 For governmental entities, the relevant
inquiry is simply whether the activity in which the injured
worker was engaged at the time of the accident is among those
that the governmental entity may or must perform. 180 Because
171. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-302(A) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004)
(emphasis added)).
172. Id. at 222, 591 S.E.2d at 74.
173. Id. at 221, 591 S.E.2d at 74.
174. Id. at 222, 591 S.E.2d at 74.
175. 97 Va. 472, 476, 34 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1899) (stating that because of the extent of con-
trol by the legislature, property of the University of Virginia should be treated as state
property for determining the applicability of mechanics' liens).
176. Jones, 267 Va. at 223, 591 S.E.2d at 75.
177. Id. at 223-24, 591 S.E.2d at 75.
178. Id. at 223, 591 S.E.2d at 75.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Nichols v. VVKR, Inc., 241 Va. 516, 521, 403 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1991)).
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the Board of UVA was required by statute to preserve and care
for its property, and because asbestos abatement was in further-
ance of that mandate, Jones was working in UVA's "trade or
business" and was properly considered to be its statutory em-
ployee.181 Therefore, his civil suit was barred by the exclusive
remedy provision of the Act.182
III. BENEFITS: SELECT ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
A. Wage Loss Benefits: Temporary Total and Temporary Partial
Calculation of the average weekly wage to determine a sole
proprietor's temporary total benefit was the issue in Brown v.
Brown.183 The Commission concluded that the profit amount in
the employer's profit and loss statement, reduced by certain ex-
penses, more accurately reflected the claimant's earnings during
the fifty-two-week period immediately preceding the injury than
did the employer's Schedule C." 8 The two documents covered dif-
ferent fifty-two-week periods." 5 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
affirmed, noting that the primary purpose of the average weekly
wage calculation "'is to approximate the [claimant's] economic
loss,'"186 and that the Commission is required to best estimate the
diminution in the claimant's earning capacity.187
Eligibility for temporary partial disability benefits was the fo-
cus of Clements v. Riverside Walter Reed Hospital.' Brenda
Clements appealed the Commission's decision terminating her
outstanding award, which found that she failed to show sufficient
justification for refusing selective employment, and that she sub-
181. Id. at 224-25, 591 S.E.2d at 76.
182. Id. at 225, 591 S.E.2d at 76. The court also rejected Jones' argument that the Vir-
ginia Tort Claims Act requires that the Commonwealth be treated as a private person for
purposes of workers' compensation liability. Id.
183. 40 Va. App. 79, 577 S.E.2d 543 (Ct. App. 2003).
184. Id. at 83, 577 S.E.2d at 545.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 84, 577 S.E.2d at 545 (quoting Bosworth v. 7-Up Distrib. Co., 4 Va. App.
161, 163, 355 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 1987)).
187. Id. (citing Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 441, 339 S.E.2d
570, 573 (Ct. App. 1986)).
188. 40 Va. App 214, 578 S.E.2d 814 (Ct. App. 2003).
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sequently failed to cure the refusal.18 9 With respect to justification
for the claimant's refusal, the court of appeals stated that once
the employer shows that it procured and made an offer of suitable
work which the claimant refused, "the burden then shifts to the
claimant 'to show justification for refusing the offer."'' 90 In revers-
ing the Commission's decision, the court noted that the Commis-
sion failed to examine the "totality of the evidence" '191 when it did
not give appropriate consideration to the claimant's testimony
that she would have been forced to forfeit accrued benefit bal-
ances if she were to take the offered employment.192 The court af-
firmed the decision on the curing issue, however, because the
claimant's attempted self-employment selling cosmetics was not
comparable to her previous work as a registered nurse.1 93
Marketing-the requirement that a partially disabled claimant
seeking benefits make reasonable efforts to find work-was the
issue in Allen v. Southern Commercial Repair, Inc.'94 Allen ap-
pealed the termination of his temporary partial benefits because
he failed to make reasonable efforts to market his residual work
capacity. 195 Allen was an electrician with a GED and held con-
tractor and tradesman licenses.1 96 He was restricted from lifting
after his compensable injury.'97 The liable employer discharged
him after the injury, and two subsequent employers laid him
off.'98 Allen then started his own electrical business and "made a
concerted effort to" make it viable.' 99
The Court of Appeals of Virginia first noted that whether a
claimant's marketing efforts are reasonable is a fact-based in-
quiry, and it listed some of the factors the Commission may con-
sider.2 °0 These factors include the claimant's training and experi-
189. Id. at 218, 578 S.E.2d at 815.
190. Id. at 222, 578 S.E.2d at 817 (quoting Ballweg v. Crowder Contracting Co., 247
Va. 205, 209,440 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1994)).
191. Id., 578 S.E.2d at 817-18 (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
Lawrence, 38 Va. App. 656, 662, 568 S.E.2d 374, 377 (Ct. App. 2002)).
192. Id. at 223-24, 578 S.E.2d at 818.
193. Id. at 225-26, 578 S.E.2d at 819-20.
194. 40 Va. App. 116, 118, 578 S.E.2d 64, 65 (Ct. App. 2003).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 118-19, 578 S.E.2d at 65.
197. Id. at 119-20, 578 S.E.2d at 66.
198. Id. at 119, 578 S.E.2d at 65.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 120-21, 578 S.E.2d at 66 (citing GreifCos. v. Sipe, 16 Va. App. 709, 715, 434
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ence, the nature of his disability, and characteristics of the rele-
vant labor market. °1 Applying these standards, the court con-
cluded that Allen's limited efforts at finding employment after his
discharge by the liable employer and before starting his own
business were insufficient.2 2 Although self-employment may con-
stitute reasonable marketing efforts, it did not in this case, be-
cause Allen failed "to show that self-employment was [his] only
remaining employment option or that he could not successfully
obtain employment with other contractors that more fully reflect
his residual earning capacity."20 3
B. Twenty-Percent Penalty for Late Payments of Compensation
An interesting procedural twist had profound ramifications for
the employer's liability for penalty in Washington v. United Par-
cel Service of America.24 United Parcel Service ("UPS") sus-
pended benefits under an open award, alleging that Washington
was released to full-duty work.20 ' It did not file, however, an ap-
propriate employer's application.2 6 The issue was consolidated
with a causation issue, which was resolved in the employer's fa-
vor.20 7 As a result of the ruling on the causation issue, the Com-
mission closed the open award and held that, because no compen-
sation was due once the claimant was returned to work, the
employer owed no penalty on unpaid benefits under Virginia
Code section 65.2-524."8 The Court of Appeals of Virginia af-
firmed this determination, adopting a rationale substantially
similar to the Commission's.2 9
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, finding that the no-
tice of the deputy commissioner's hearing did not sufficiently
S.E.2d 314, 318 (Ct. App. 1993)).
201. Id. at 121, 578 S.E.2d at 66 (citing Nat'l Linen Serv. v. McGuinn, 8 Va. App. 267,
271-72, 380 S.E.2d 31, 34 (Ct. App. 1989)).
202. Id. at 121-22, 578 S.E.2d at 67.
203. Id. at 122-23, 578 S.E.2d at 67.
204. 267 Va. 539, 593 S.E.2d 229.
205. Id. at 542, 593 S.E.2d at 230.
206. Id. at 545, 593 S.E.2d at 232.
207. See id. at 543, 593 S.E.2d at 231.
208. Id. at 543-44, 593 S.E.2d at 231.
209. 39 Va. App. 772, 778-81, 576 S.E.2d 791, 794-95 (Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 267 Va.
539, 593 S.E.2d. 229.
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identify the causation issue relied upon by the Commission and
the court of appeals to close the open award and to deny the pen-
alty request.21 ° That issue, however, was not properly before the
Commission.2 ' Accordingly, there was no basis upon which to ap-
ply the doctrine of imposition to prevent the claimant's unjust en-
richment, and benefits remained owing under the open award.212
Because the employer had not filed an appropriate application
properly suspending benefits, the Commission and the court of
appeals erred in not awarding the penalty.213
The time within which the employer must pay settlement pro-
ceeds to avoid imposition of the twenty percent penalty was the
sole issue in Ratliff v. Carter Machinery Co. 214 The parties settled
the claim for a lump sum amount, and the Commission approved
the settlement by order dated September 7, 2001, which provided
that the amount of the settlement was "due within ten (10) days
after entry of this Order." 215 Ratliff s attorney received the check
on October 1, but Ratliff did not receive the check until October
2.216 Upholding the Commission's denial of penalty, the court of
appeals focused on the second sentence of Virginia Code section
65.2-524 providing that "[n]o penalty shall be added.., to any
payment made within two weeks after the expiration of (i) the pe-
riod in which Commission review may be requested pursuant to §
65.2-705.217 The plain meaning of this section "expressly prohib-
its the imposition of a twenty percent penalty... until fourteen
days after the time for review has expired."218 The court of ap-
peals rejected the claimant's argument that Virginia Code section
65.2-524 did not apply to settlements where the parties expressly
agreed on the date on which payment is to be made.219
210. 267 Va. at 546-47, 593 S.E.2d at 233.
211. Id. at 546, 593 S.E.2d at 233.
212. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 232-33.
213. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 233.
214. 39 Va. App. 586, 575 S.E.2d 571 (Ct. App. 2003).
215. Id. at 588, 575 S.E.2d at 572.
216. Id. at 588-89, 575 S.E.2d at 573.
217. Id. at 590, 575 S.E.2d at 573 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-524 (Repl. Vol. 2002 &
Cum. Supp. 2004)).
218. Id. at 592, 575 S.E.2d at 574.
219. Id. at 591, 575 S.E.2d at 574.
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C. Cost of Living Adjustment ("COLA")
Adequacy of Commission findings on a COLA application was
the crucial issue in Powhatan Correctional Center v. Mitchell-
Riggleman.22 ° The deputy commissioner entered an award for
COLA benefits for the period of October 1, 1992 through Novem-
ber 30, 1999, finding that the claimant's social security benefits
made her ineligible for COLA after November 1999.221 On review,
the Commission affirmed the award, noting that verification from
the Social Security Administration established that the "'claimant
began receiving retirement benefits in February 2000' and that
the "'Commission's calculations dated August 2001' were cor-
rect.222 The employer appealed the COLA award, and the Court of
Appeals of Virginia vacated the Commission's decision and re-
manded for further findings.223 The court reasoned that the
Commission's review opinion appeared to award COLA benefits
beginning February 2000, a period for which the deputy declined
to make such an award.224 Because the Commission, on review,
did not make factual findings supporting the additional award
period, its opinion was deficient under Virginia Code section 65.2-
705(A).225
D. Employer's Credit for Benefits Paid
In McFadden v. Carpet House,226 the employer requested a
credit for benefits it paid to the claimant between the time he was
released to return to his pre-injury work and the time it filed an
application suspending benefits.227 The deputy commissioner
awarded credit, finding that to do otherwise would "unjustly en-
rich the claimant,"228 and the Commission affirmed, finding that
these were voluntary payments subject to credit.229 The Court of
220. 40 Va. App. 491, 579 S.E.2d 696 (Ct. App. 2003).
221. Id. at 494, 579 S.E.2d at 698.
222. Id. at 495, 579 S.E.2d at 698.
223. Id. at 492, 496, 579 S.E.2d at 697-98.
224. Id. at 495-96, 579 S.E.2d at 698.
225. Id.
226. 42 Va. App. 302, 591 S.E.2d 708 (Ct. App. 2004).
227. Id. at 304, 591 S.E.2d at 709.
228. Id. at 305, 591 S.E.2d at 710.
229. Id. at 305-06, 591 S.E.2d at 710.
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Appeals of Virginia reversed, however, holding that the Commis-
sion's interpretation of Virginia Code section 65.2-520 to allow a
credit in this case was so broad "as to nullify the provisions of
Code §§ 65.2-708 and 65.2-712. ""23 Those sections provide that,
generally, "an employer seeking to terminate an outstanding
award may affect that award only prospectively."23' Furthermore,
the Commission's award of the credit was inconsistent with
Collins v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,232 which held
that benefits paid under an open award entered pursuant to the
parties' "agreement were not 'voluntary payments' within the
meaning of Code § 65.2-520. "233 Absent circumstances justifying
application of the equitable doctrine of imposition, the Commis-
sion was without authority to order the credit.234
IV. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. Assertion of Employer's Subrogation Interest
Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. v. Courtaulds Performance Films,
Inc.23 clarified the nature of employer's subrogation.236 The facts
are relatively straightforward. On June 1, 2001, Milton Oakley, a
Yellow Freight Systems driver, settled his third party suit
against Courtaulds which stemmed from the accident that caused
his compensable injuries during his employment with Yellow
Freight.237 Previously, Yellow Freight sent letters to claimant's
counsel asserting that it had a "'lien' or "'subrogation claim"' in
the amount of $56,256.69 for benefits it paid to Oakley under the
Act.2 38
On June 7, 2001, Yellow Freight filed a petition with the Cir-
cuit Court of Henry County requesting a determination of the
230. Id. at 309-11, 591 S.E.2d at 712.
231. Id. at 309, 591 S.E.2d at 712.
232. 21 Va. App. 671, 467 S.E.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1996), affd on reh'g en banc, 22 Va.
App. 625, 472 S.E.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1996).
233. McFadden, 42 Va. App at 308, 591 S.E.2d at 711 (quoting Collins, 21 Va. App. at
675-76, 467 S.E.2d at 281)).
234. See id. at 308-09, 591 S.E.2d at 711.
235. 266 Va. 57, 580 S.E.2d 812 (2003).
236. Id. at 63-65, 580 S.E.2d at 814-15.
237. Id. at 60-61, 580 S.E.2d at 813.
238. Id. at 60, 580 S.E.2d at 813.
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amount of benefits paid to Oakley and asking the court to issue
an order directing Courtaulds to pay that amount directly to Yel-
low Freight from the settlement proceeds.239 The circuit court de-
nied the request, finding that the petition was not filed timely
under Virginia Code section 65.2-310.24 0 It reasoned that the set-
tlement before the date Yellow Freight filed its petition "extin-
guished Yellow Freight's unmatured [sic] claim."241
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed this decision, observ-
ing that Virginia Code section 65.2-310 protects "the employer by
allowing recovery of compensation paid to its employee ... when
the employee files an independent action against the responsible
third party."24 2 The supreme court then attempted to clarify the
nature of the employer's right as being one of subrogation rather
than a lien. 243 The supreme court distinguished Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Fisher,244 because that case did not involve a
timeliness issue, and because the third party suit there was a
wrongful death action the settlement of which required approval
of the circuit court under Virginia Code section 8.01-55.245 The
supreme court, however, blurred the nature of the employer's in-
terest at issue by stating that "the right of subrogation granted by
this statute does not mature into an enforceable claim or lien
unless, and until the right is perfected by the employer."246 The
necessary perfecting act, in the context of a third party action
brought by the employee, is the employer's filing of a petition or
motion prior to verdict in the third party action as required by
Virginia Code section 65.2-310.247 Because the petition constitut-
ing perfection in this case was filed after execution of the third
party settlement by which the employee relinquished all his
claims, no interest remained to which the employer could be sub-
239. Id. at 61, 580 S.E.2d at 813.
240. Id. at 61-62, 580 S.E.2d at 813.
241. Id. at 61, 580 S.E.2d at 813.
242. Id. at 62, 580 S.E.2d at 814.
243. Id. at 63, 580 S.E.2d at 814-15.
244. 263 Va. 78, 557 S.E.2d 209 (2002). In Fisher the Supreme Court of Virginia found
that the trial court erred in barring an employer from recovering on a "lien" for benefits
paid to the dependent of a deceased worker who renounced rights to any proceeds from the
settlement of a resulting third party wrongful death action. Id. at 87, 557 S.E.2d at 213.
245. Yellow Freight, 266 Va. at 63, 580 S.E.2d at 814.
246. Id. at 64, 580 S.E.2d at 815.
247. Id. at 64-65, 580 S.E.2d at 815.
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rogated,248 and the circuit court properly denied Yellow Freight's
petition.249
B. Employers'Applications
In Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. v. Pugh,25 ° the claimant was
awarded temporary total disability benefits for her July 20, 2000
injury. 21 The employer filed an application in August 2002 alleg-
ing that the claimant returned to work on July 31, 2000 and that
compensation was last paid on July 30, 2000.22 The Commission
rejected the application, finding that it did not comply with
Commission Rule 1.4, which required change-in-condition appli-
cations to be "'filed within two years from the date compensation
was last paid pursuant to an award.' 253 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia rejected the employer's argument that Lam v.
Kawneer Co. 254 militated against the Commission's decision.25
Lam was distinguishable because the evidence showed that the
claimant failed to properly notify the employer of his return to
work for another employer.256 There was no similar evidence that
would provide a basis for applying the imposition doctrine to pre-
vent Pugh's unjust enrichment.257
The employer in Gallahan v. Free Lance Star Publishing Co.2" 8
filed an application to terminate an open award while the deputy
commissioner's decision awarding benefits was pending review.259
The application alleged that the claimant had been released to re-
248. Id.
249. Id.at 65, 580 S.E.2d at 815. The effect of this holding was mollified at the 2004
session of the Virginia General Assembly with the passage of amendments to Virginia
Code sections 65.2-309, -310, and -311. See Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 914, 2004 Va. Acts __
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-309 to -311 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
250. 42 Va. App. 297, 591 S.E.2d 706 (Ct. App. 2004).
251. Id. at 298-99, 591 S.E.2d at 706.
252. Id. at 299, 591 S.E.2d at 707.
253. Id. at 299-300, 591 S.E.2d at 707.
254. 38 Va. App. 515, 566 S.E.2d 874 (Ct. App. 2002). In Lam, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia found that the Commission's decision denying a penalty request despite the em-
ployer's failure to timely file an application supported by evidence of the claimant's behav-
ior justified the application of the imposition doctrine. Id. at 520, 566 S.E.2d at 876.
255. Genesis Health Ventures, 42 Va. App. at 300, 591 S.E.2d at 707.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 300-01, 591 S.E.2d at 707-08.
258. 41 Va. App. 694, 589 S.E.2d 12 (Ct. App. 2003).
259. Id. at 697, 589 S.E.2d at 14.
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turn to her pre-injury employment; however, the employer did not
pay benefits up to the date of the application.26 ° The Commission
rejected the claimant's argument that the application was im-
properly filed for the employer's failure to pay benefits.26' The
Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, holding that, pursuant to
Virginia Code sections 65.2-705 and 65.2-706(A) and (C), the dep-
uty commissioner's decision was not final during the time the re-
view was pending and finding that the award was suspended dur-
ing the time an appeal is pending.262 Moreover, Commission Rule
1.4(D) permits "employers to file applications when awards are
suspended." 263 Accordingly, the Commission did not err in finding
that the application was properly filed despite the failure to pay
compensation.2'6
C. De Facto Awards
White v. Redman Corp.265 addressed whether a de facto award
can arise where the parties fail to reach agreement on the
amount of compensation. 266 The carrier sent the claimant an
agreement form, but there was no evidence that the claimant ever
signed it. 267 The claimant contended that a de facto award re-
sulted because the parties stipulated compensability and the em-
ployer made voluntary payments for several months.268 The
Commission disagreed because there was no evidence that the
parties had agreed on the amount of compensation.269 The Court
of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, finding that the express language
of Virginia Code section 65.2-701(C) "recognizes that the amount
of compensation is a necessary part of the agreement,"2 70 and the
260. Id.
261. See id. at 697-98, 589 S.E.2d at 14.
262. Id. at 701, 589 S.E.2d at 16.
263. Id. at 700, 589 S.E.2d at 17.
264. Id. at 702, 589 S.E.2d at 17.
265. 41 Va. App. 287, 584 S.E.2d 462 (Ct. App. 2003).
266. Id. at 290, 584 S.E.2d at 463.
267. Id. at 289-90, 584 S.E.2d at 463.
268. Id. at 291, 584 S.E.2d at 464.
269. Id. at 290, 584 S.E.2d at 463.
270. Id. at 292, 584 S.E.2d at 464.
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absence of agreement on that point precludes the entry of a de
facto award.271
D. Evidentiary Matters
The after-discovered evidence rule was the focus of Estate of
Kiser v. Pulaski Furniture Co.272 At the close of an initial hearing,
the deputy commissioner left the record open for "additional
medical evidence."273 While the record remained open, the deputy
commissioner granted the employer's request to reconvene the
hearing to take testimony from a new witness who had notified
the employer after the first hearing that he had witnessed the
employee's alleged accident.274 Both the Commission and the
Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected the claimants' contention
that Commission Rule 3.3 barred the testimony, reasoning that it
applied only to attempts to introduce new evidence on review, and
not to a reconvened hearing before a deputy commissioner while
the record was held open.275 The court of appeals also determined
that the Commission appropriately "applied the 'not reasonably
available' standard in determining that the deputy commissioner
had not abused his discretion" in accepting the witness's testi-
mony.276
E. Filing a Claim with the Commission
Fairfax County School Board v. Humphrey2 77 examined what
constitutes a proper claim for benefits under the Act.27' The par-
ties fully executed a Memorandum of Agreement that the carrier
forwarded to the Commission.279 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
and the Commission both held that this was sufficient to consti-
tute a claim even though the submission was made by the carrier,
271. Id.; accord, Watts v. P & J Hauling, Inc., 41 Va. App. 278, 584 S.E.2d 457 (Ct.
App. 2003).
272. 41 Va. App. 293, 295-96, 584 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ct. App. 2003).
273. Id. at 296, 584 S.E.2d at 466.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 298, 584 S.E.2d at 467.
276. Id.
277. 41 Va. App. 147, 583 S.E.2d 65 (Ct. App. 2003).
278. Id. at 150, 583 S.E.2d at 66.
279. Id. at 151, 583 S.E.2d at 66.
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noting that "[n]o statutory language delineates who must deliver
the claim for benefits to the commission or how it should be
filed."2"' Furthermore, the employer's subsequent withdrawal of
its consent to the agreement and resulting vacating of the award
does not nullify the filing because these actions did not affect
"[t]he information contained in the memorandum describing the
parties, the claimant's injuries and her request for benefits."2"'
The tolling provision of Virginia Code section 65.2-602 was the
focus of Hall v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.282 Hall was injured on De-
cember 24, 1998 but did not file a claim until March 21, 2001.283
She alleged that the two-year statute of limitations period was
tolled because the employer did not submit an Employer's Acci-
dent Report as required by Virginia Code section 65.2_900.2' The
Commission found that the employer's failure to file the Em-
ployer's Accident Report within two years of the accident tolled
the statute of limitations. 285 The Court of Appeals of Virginia re-
versed, rejecting that the Commission's per se approach applied to
the tolling of the statute of limitations where the employer failed
to timely file the accident report.28 6 The court reasoned that such
an approach is inconsistent with Virginia Code section 65.2-602
and that, instead, the claimant has the burden of proving actual
prejudice resulting from the employer's omission to justify tolling
the statute of limitations.287
F. Hearing Procedure: Contemporaneous Objection Rule
In Williams v. Gloucester Sheriffs Department,8 8 the deputy
commissioner denied the claim and the Commission affirmed the
denial, but on different grounds.289 The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia rejected Williams's appeal, applying Court of Appeals Rule
5A:18 and "holding that [he] failed to preserve the issue for ap-
280. Id. at 154, 583 S.E.2d at 68.
281. Id. at 158, 583 S.E.2d at 70.
282. 41 Va. App. 835, 589 S.E.2d 484 (Ct. App. 2003).
283. Id. at 837, 589 S.E.2d at 485.
284. Id. at 838, 589 S.E.2d at 486.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 838-41, 589 S.E.2d at 486-87.
287. Id. at 841-42, 589 S.E.2d at 487-88.
288. 266 Va. 409, 587 S.E.2d 546 (2003).
289. Id. at 410, 587 S.E.2d at 547.
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peal because he did not file a motion for reconsideration raising
[the] issue before the Commission."29 ° At the Supreme Court of
Virginia, Williams argued that the contemporaneous objection
rule should not apply because there is no formal process for ob-
taining reconsideration by the Commission. 91 The supreme court
acknowledged this fact but affirmed the decision, stating that
"nevertheless such motions are not uncommon, and the Commis-
sion may vacate the original decision pending consideration of
such a motion."
2 92
V. 2003 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES RELEVANT TO WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
During the 2003 General Assembly session, the definitional
provisions of Virginia Code section 65.2-101 were amended to re-
spond to questions about potential coverage for healthcare pro-
viders required to receive smallpox vaccines. 293 The Act's defini-
tion of "injury" now includes "any injury, disease or condition...
[a]rising out of and in the course of the employment of' health-
care providers and other listed individuals "[r]esulting from (a)
the administration of vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine, Cidofivir and
derivatives thereof, or Vaccinia Immune Globulin as part of fed-
erally initiated smallpox countermeasures, or (b) transmission of
vaccinia in the course of employment from an employee partici-
pating in such countermeasures to a coemployee of the same em-
ployer."2 94
Virginia Code section 65.2-402.1, added at the 2002 session of
the General Assembly, provides a presumption that "[hiepatitis,
meningococcal meningitis, tuberculosis, [and] HIV" are covered
occupational diseases when contracted by certain law enforce-
ment officers and other enumerated individuals.295 As it was
originally enacted, the statute provided that the presumption was
"not effective until six months following" certain examinations
described in subsection E of the statute, which found the person
290. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 547-48.
291. Id. at 411, 587 S.E.2d at 548.
292. Id.
293. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
294. Id.
295. Id. § 65.2-402.1 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
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invoking the presumption to be free of the listed diseases.29 6 At
the 2003 session, an exception was added to this waiting period
provision where the individual invoking the presumption "can
demonstrate a documented exposure [to the disease pathogen]
during the six-month period."
297
Another amendment passed in 2003 changed the Commission's
procedures for sending copies of opinions to parties under Vir-
ginia Code sections 65.2-704, -705, and -706.298 In Peacock v.
Browning Ferris, Inc.,299 the Court of Appeals of Virginia held
that the Commission's practice of sending a copy of an opinion
only to counsel where a party is represented did not satisfy the
requirement of Virginia Code section 65.2-704(A) that "'[a] copy of
the award or opinion ... be sent ... to the parties at issue by reg-
istered or certified mail."'3 °° In response, the statute was amended
in 2003, adding that "[ilf any party at issue is represented by
counsel, receipt of the award or opinion by counsel shall be
deemed receipt by the party for purposes of subsection A of sec-
tion 65.2-705.,,301 The amendments to Virginia Code section 65.2-
704 also changed the acceptable mode for sending opinions from
certified or registered mail to "priority mail with delivery confir-
mation or equivalent mailing option."30 2
VI. CONCLUSION
Many of the principles regarding compensability and benefits
discussed in this article have their genesis in statutory language
substantially similar to that found in the original Workers' Com-
pensation Act dating back to 1918. These principles have proved
to be sufficiently malleable over the years to accommodate a
broad array of factual and procedural patterns. "Flexibility" and
"creativity" will continue to be watchwords in applying workers'
compensation law as practitioners and adjudicators attempt to
address the emergent and evolving properties of our social milieu.
296. Id. § 65.2-402.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
297. See id. § 65.2-402.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
298. Id. §§ 65.2-704 to -706 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
299. 38 Va. App. 241, 563 S.E.2d 368 (Ct. App. 2002).
300. Id. at 250-51, 563 S.E.2d at 373 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-704(A) (Repl. Vol.
2002)).
301. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-704(A) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
302. Id.
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Perhaps the most immediate challenge for the workers' com-
pensation system will come from the increase in alternative work-
ing arrangements in American businesses. Companies are aug-
menting traditional workplace models, where full-time employees
work on the employer's premises, with new working arrange-
ments such as contract and leased employees, outsourcing, and
off-site workers. Shifts in commuting patterns and the advent of
"telecommuting" will raise challenging questions in applying the
"arising out of' and "in the course of' requirements. Distinctions
between work-related and other activities can break down as
workers perform more job functions at home and in their cars.
Developing trends in the structures of health care delivery sys-
tems will also play a pivotal role in shaping the future of workers'
compensation. Increasing availability and use of acute care facili-
ties and streamlining of medical practices will pose interesting
questions in applying the concept of the "panel of physicians" the
employer is required to provide to the worker at the time of the
injury. Escalating costs and resulting cost-containment strategies
will have an appreciable impact on many aspects of claim man-
agement, including vocational rehabilitation.
Catastrophic events, such as natural disasters and the tragic
and unnerving events of September 11, 2001, have already cata-
lyzed debate and change as seen in last year's legislation attempt-
ing to clarify murky issues as to coverage for some of those whose
work puts them on the frontline in responding to potential acts of
terrorism. It would be naive to think that the deep societal
change wrought by these events will not require correspondingly
deep thought by legislators and adjudicators in compensating
workers and their families, and in assigning resulting risk and li-
ability, in the future.
Workers' compensation laws were enacted to balance the com-
peting interests of injured workers in having a prompt remedy for
their work-related injuries and illnesses against those of employ-
ers in having certainty and predictability in risk management.
For almost ninety years, the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act
has successfully met the challenge of providing reasonable wage
loss benefits and medical care for injured workers, at reasonable
costs to employers, in the face of change at an unprecedented
rate. It will continue to grow and evolve to meet the needs of the
Commonwealth and its citizens.
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